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ABSTRACT 
 
A new type of train configuration, known as Open Wide Gangway (OWG) is becoming 
popular, particularly in underground environments. Previous fire modelling analysis  
demonstrated that the OWG configuration was considered safe as or safer than conventional 
configurations as it reduced the likelihood of flashover. However, these studies have ignored 
the impact on evacuation of the spread of fire effluent to non-fire cars.  Here we explore the 
fire safety offered by conventional and OWG configurations using coupled fire and 
evacuation modelling techniques. Two tunnel train situations are considered; one in which 
the car side doors are available for evacuation (train in a wide tunnel) and the other in which 
only the end cab doors are available (train in a narrow tunnel).  Two population 
configurations are considered, fully and half loaded. Two ignition sources are also considered, 
one representing an accidental fire and the other an arson fire. The analysis demonstrates that 
while the OWG configuration may produce improved fire performance in the car of fire 
origin compared to the conventional configuration, if the interaction of the fire effluent with 
the evacuating passengers is considered, the OWG configuration results in a significantly 
greater number of casualties in virtually all the scenarios considered.   
 
Key words: Open wide gangway, underground train fire, tunnel fire, Fire modelling, 
Evacuation modelling.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Situations requiring a rapid evacuation of passenger trains are rare however, the most critical 
incidents are those involving fire [1].  Even in fire situations, it may not be necessary to 
evacuate from the train, the movement of passengers to a place of relative safety on the train 
being preferred to evacuation to the track side.  In conventional trains, passenger cars (also 
referred to as carriages) are typically separated by internal doors (ID), which while usually 
closed, allow passengers to move between the cars.  In the event of an internal fire, these 
doors provide passengers with some degree of protection from the developing fire and the fire 
effluent as they act as a barrier, if closed, to the spreading fire effluent.  Passengers can move 
from the car of fire origin to the neighbouring cars, closing the doors behind them.  For 
scenarios involving over-ground trains, should an evacuation be required, passengers can exit 
the train through the carriage side doors down to the track side. In underground tunnel 
environments the situation is more complex and is dependent on the geometry of the tunnel. 
If the train is in a wide tunnel, evacuation can occur from the car side doors directly to the 
track side as in over-ground trains [2].  However, if the train is in a narrow tunnel, as may be 
found in some older underground systems, evacuation from the car side doors may be 
impossible as there is insufficient room for passengers to safely exit the train and walk 
alongside the train.  In this case, passengers must move through the train from car to car until 
reaching the drivers cab or end cab, which allows egress to the track side [2].  
 
Open wide gangway (OWG) trains are a relatively new concept in passenger train design that 
is being introduced in many over-ground and underground rail networks worldwide.  OWG 
trains consist of what is essentially one long passenger compartment, with no partitions or 
doors between cars. The attraction of OWG trains is that they can accommodate more 
passengers than the conventional passenger train configuration; they facilitate more efficient 
boarding/disembarkation at stations and because of their open design, provide a better 
security environment for passengers.  However, as there is no longer a barrier between the 
cars to prevent the spread of fire and fire effluent, the concept of a place of relative safety on 
board is compromised.  In fire situations, the absence of inter-car doors in OWG trains could 
potentially expose passengers in non-fire cars to life threatening fire hazards sooner than 
would be the case in the conventional configuration, especially in situations where the end 
cab doors are the only means available for egress to the track side.   
 
The fire safety issues related to the OWG trains are to a certain degree not in conformance 
with the design principles for underground trains in UK [2], which specifies that each car 
should be in effect a fire resisting box, with fire resisting floors and doors between cars.  
Furthermore, not much research effort appears to have been invested into this important topic.  
Chiam [3] has numerically simulated fire growth and flame spread in Singapore Circle line 
OWG trains under forced ventilation conditions.  In his study, flashover was not observed 
with ignition sources representing arson fires.  With the same train interior materials as in 
Chiam’s work, Ting et al [4] has further confirmed that, “the use of flame retardant, BS6853 
Cat 1a compliant materials suitably avoids flashover within the cabin and prevents the 
uncontrolled spread of fire to adjacent cars”.  
 
Their analyses have assumed that the primary impact on life safety is the occurrence of 
flashover.  However, this is not necessarily the case as the spreading fire effluent may also 
have a significant impact on life safety.  Thus it is important to establish whether or not the 
spreading fire effluent will impact passenger evacuation and survivability even if a flashover 
does not occur or even if the fire is not sustainable.  In this study, this issue is explored 
through numerical simulations using the coupled fire and evacuation simulation technique 
with the SMARTFIRE [5] CFD fire simulation software and the railEXODUS [1, 6] 
evacuation simulation tool. In this paper, sixteen evacuation scenarios corresponding to ten 
fire scenarios involving a train in a tunnel with various car separation configurations, 
available train exits for evacuation, population loads and ignition sources are defined and 
investigated using the coupled fire and evacuation analysis.   
 
FIRE AND EVACUATION SCENARIOS 
 
The base configuration used in this study is loosely based on the four-car Class 378 train, 
which is in use on London’s underground system [7]. In this study, two different car 
separation configurations are considered, OWG and conventional internal doors.  As seen in 
Fig. 1, the conventional internal doorway is assumed to be 0.8 m wide and 1.9 m high.  The 
dimensions of the connecting region between OWG cars are; 1.2 m wide and 1.9 m high.  
These dimensions are approximations to the measurements of existing cars, and are not 
intended to be exact measurements for any particular train.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Sizes of OWG and conventional internal door. 
 
Train fires usually start with a small primary fire, the ignition source, and subsequently 
spread to car interior materials such as seat foam, wall panels and floor carpet etc. The 
resulting fire effluent can spread from car to car impacting the safety and evacuation of 
passengers. The nature of the ignition source is an important factor in determining whether or 
not the fire will grow to consume train materials and the speed of the subsequent developing 
fire.  To specify the fire scenario it is therefore necessary to first define appropriate fire 
ignition sources. Two ignition sources are considered in this study. One is representative of a 
slowly developing luggage fire and the other is intended to represent a fast growth luggage 
fire. The heat release rates (HRR) of the two ignition sources are depicted in Fig. 2, one is 
intended to represent the development of an accidental fire and the other is intended to 
represent the development of a deliberate arson fire. An ignition source of between 25 and 
200 kW is necessary to promote a significant fire spread in materials typically found on 
modern trains [8]. Therefore, both ignition sources have a peak HRR in excess of 500 kW as 
shown in Fig. 2. The first ignition source, called “accidental” in this study, has a fire growth 
rate identical to that used by Ting et al [4] to investigate the spread of fire between cars in 
OWG trains. However, the most common train fires are started by arson, which account for 
nearly 70% of total train fires [3]. Fire accelerants are often involved in arson fires. An 
example is the Daegu subway fire on February 18, 2003, South Korea, killed at least 192 
people and injured at least 148, in which 4 litres of volatile material were used by the arsonist 
[9]. Fire accelerants such as gasoline will enable a fire to reach its peak HRR as early as 20 
seconds for common flooring materials [10]. This second ignition source, the fast growth 
luggage fire, is used to represent a deliberately started fire as may occur in an arson or 
terrorist attack. The two ignition sources shown in Fig. 2 are compliant with BS 6853, in 
which a large ignition source is suggested in the order of 100 kW [2].    
 
Given the two ignition sources, a total of sixteen evacuation scenarios, corresponding to ten 
fire scenarios, are defined for investigation in this study. These consist of combinations of the 
car separation configurations i.e. OWG and ID configuration, population loading i.e. fully 
loaded with 715 passengers and half loading with 360 passengers and exit door availability 
i.e. side doors or end doors. In each scenario, the train is assumed to be in a tunnel and not at 
the station platform.  This makes evacuation more challenging as passengers must descend 
approximately 1m to the track side rather than simply step out onto the platform.   
 
Table 1 lists all the scenarios investigated. The full population load corresponds to a density 
of approximate 5 persons/m2, which is the observed maximum standing capacity for rolling 
stock on London Underground [11]. Scenarios S1-S4 use the accidental fire as the ignition 
source. In Scenarios 1 and 2 passengers use the car side doors for evacuation, with Scenario 1 
involving the OWG configuration while Scenario 2 involves the ID configuration.  
Furthermore, in Scenario 2, the internal doors between the cars remain closed throughout the 
simulation as passengers evacuate via the side doors. In Scenarios 3 and 4 only the end cab 
doors are available for evacuation, with Scenario 3 involving the OWG configuration and 
Scenario 4 involves the ID configuration.  In Scenario 4, the internal doors are all open at the 
start of the simulation as passengers attempt to move between cars and are closed after the 
last survivor passes through the door. In addition, the ‘a’ scenarios involve the maximum 
passenger load while the ‘b’ scenarios involve half the maximum passenger load.  As the 
number of passengers in an evacuation scenario will impact the door closure times, this will 
in turn impact the ventilation within the train and hence the fire development.  Thus the fire 
scenarios associated with the evacuation Scenarios 4a and 4b (scenarios involving ID 
configuration in which only the end cab doors are available for evacuation) are different due 
to the use of different population loads. Scenarios S5-S8 are the same as Scenarios S1-S4 but 
have the arson fire as the ignition source.   
 
In all the scenarios considered the train is assumed to be within a tunnel.  Passengers are 
expected to evacuate to the ground when using the car end doors (S3, S4, S7, S8) or to a side 
walkway when using the side doors (S1, S2, S5, S6).  The fire effluent spreads into the tunnel 
from the rail cars via the open doors.  However, forced ventilation within the tunnel is not 
considered and it is further assumed that there is no natural air movement at the start of the 
simulation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. HRRs of luggage fires as ignition sources of the accident fire and the arson fire. 
 
Table 1. Fire and evacuation scenarios.  
Fire 
Scenario 
Evacuation 
Scenario 
Car separation Opening exits for 
evacuation 
Population 
load 
Fire  
S1 S1a OWG Side passenger doors Full   
 
 
 
 
 
Accidental 
fire 
S1b OWG Side passenger doors Half  
S2 
 
S2a  ID Side passenger doors Full  
S2b  ID Side passenger doors Half  
S3 S3a OWG End Cab doors Full  
S3b OWG      End Cab doors Half  
S4a S4a  ID a End Cab doors Full  
S4b S4b ID a End Cab doors Half  
S5 
 
S5a OWG Side passenger doors Full   
 
 
 
 
 
Arson fire  
S5b OWG Side passenger doors Half  
S6 S6a  ID Side passenger doors Full  
S6b  ID Side passenger doors Half  
S7 S7a OWG End Cab doors Full  
S7b OWG     End Cab doors Half  
S8a S8a  ID a End Cab doors Full  
S8b S8b  ID a End Cab doors Half  
aThe internal doors between cars are shut after the last survivor passes through the doorway. 
 COUPLED FIRE AND EVACUATION ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
 
In this section, the coupled fire and evacuation simulation technique is described using the 
fire engineering tools, SMARTFIRE and railEXODUS. The SMARTFIRE V4.1 [5] software 
is used as the base model to perform the fire simulations in this study. The CFD engine in 
SMARTFIRE has many physics features that are required for fire field modelling, such as the 
multiple ray radiation model, the volumetric heat release model, the gaseous combustion 
model, smoke model, toxicity model, flame spread model and k-epsilon turbulence model. 
The flame spread model [12], which is used to simulate the ignition of interior solid materials 
in the current analysis, plays an important role in successfully simulating the spread of fire 
inside the train. This model has been used to successfully simulate fire spread in several real 
fire cases/experiments including, the Swissair MD-11 in-flight fire [12], the flame spread and 
the onset of flashover in a full-scale rail car fire test [13], the Station nightclub fire mock up 
test [14], the C133 aircraft post-crash fire experiment [15] and the Manchester B737 airport 
fire [16]. The method to calculate the generation of combustion products developed in [18, 
19] is applied in this study to predict toxic gas species concentrations. In the fire analysis 
presented here the following hazards are predicted; temperatures, smoke concentrations 
(extinction coefficient), radiative flux, CO concentration, CO2 concentration and O2 
concentration.  Note that the generation of irritant fire gases is not included in these 
simulations. 
 
The railEXODUS V2.2 software is part of the EXODUS suite of evacuation simulation 
software [1, 6, 20]. The railEXODUS software comprises five core interacting sub-models: 
the PASSENGER, MOVEMENT, BEHAVIOUR, TOXICITY and HAZARD. The 
PASSENGER sub-model describes an individual as a collection of defining attributes and 
variables such as name, gender, age, maximum unhindered fast walking speed, maximum 
unhindered walking speed, response time, agility, etc. The HAZARD sub-model controls the 
atmospheric and physical environment by importing the fire data.  The TOXICITY sub-
model determines the physiological effects on an individual exposed to the toxic and thermal 
environment distributed by the HAZARD sub-model. This is determined using the Fractional 
Effective Dose (FED) and Fractional Irritant Concentration (FIC) concept [21]. Within 
railEXODUS two models are provided for the determination of the fractional effective dose 
of radiative heat, the so-called Pain Threshold model (in which the dose required to cause 
effect (Dr) is 80, which is the equivalent to an exposure of 2.5 kW/m
2 for 24 sec) and the 
Incapacitation model (in which Dr = 1000, the equivalent to an exposure to 2.6 kW/m
2 for 5 
min which can result in a 1% mortality) [14].  The Incapacitation model is used in these 
calculations. When a passenger moves through a smoke filled environment their travel speed 
is reduced according to the experimental data of Jin [22] which relates smoke extinction 
coefficient to walking speed. All these effects are communicated to the BEHAVIOUR sub-
model which, in turn, feeds through to the movement of the individual. The behaviours in 
railEXODUS include crawling, climbing over seats, wayfinding, etc.  In the coupled fire and 
evacuation analysis presented here the following fire related parameters are considered: 
 smoke extinction coefficient – related to walking speed using the Jin data [22]. 
 FIH – fractional incapacitating dose of heat, both radiative and convective (based on 
the Purser model described in [21]). 
 FIN – fractional incapacitating dose of narcotic agents, which in this simulation 
include CO, CO2 and O2 based on the Purser model described in [21]).  
 
An agent is considered incapacitated when the FED (either FIN or FIH) is equal to one.  We 
also define severe injury as an agent that has an FED (either or both FIH or FIN) between 0.5 
and 1.0.   
 
Without the consideration of the interaction between fire and evacuation, the train fire safety 
assessment is only based on the predicted HRR, time to flashover in the fire car, the spread of 
fire from car to car and the levels of fire hazards, such as temperature, heat fluxes, smoke, 
toxic gases etc., at locations of interest. Using this approach an ASET or available safe egress 
time is produced which is then compared with the RSET or required safe egress time as 
determined from an evacuation simulation tool. The investigation of the fire growth and 
flame spread in Singapore Circle line OWG trains by Chiam [3] and fire spread in a reference 
rolling stock by Ting et al [4] followed this approach (see Fig. 3). However, this approach 
fails to take into consideration the complex nature of the coupled fire and evacuation 
dynamics and may provide an over-optimistic interpretation of the scenario outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Chart flows of fire and fire/evacuation assessments. 
 
The fire and evacuation are coupled in two significant ways (Fig. 3).  The passengers’ actions 
may have a significant impact on the fire development and the spread of the fire effluents. 
Opening and closing internal doors will impact the ventilation within the train and hence the 
fire development and may also encourage or impede the spread of fire effluent to regions 
remote from the car of fire origin.  Furthermore, the fire effluent will have an impact on the 
performance and behaviour of exposed passengers and so may adversely impact survivability 
as determined through the FED analysis. These underline the importance of performing 
coupled fire and evacuation analysis in fire safety assessment, rather than just an analysis 
with only fire or only evacuation simulation. Only when coupling the fire and the evacuation 
analysis a true understanding of the implications to survivability of train car design can be 
fully appreciated. In the coupled approach the simplistic ASET/RSET analysis is replaced by 
the direct evaluation of the number of casualties (predicted incapacitations and severe 
injuries) resulting from the evacuation subjected to the developing fire.  The coupled fire and 
evacuation simulation technique using SMARTFIRE and EXODUS has been used in a 
number of applications including incident reconstruction, investigation, and engineering 
design [14, 16, 17]. In SMARTFIRE-EXODUS coupling, the computational domain used in 
the fire simulations is divided into a set of zones. The fire hazard data predicted by 
SMARTFIRE is averaged over these zones to produce two values: a hazard value at an 
arbitrary nominal head height, and a value at an arbitrary nominal knee height at each time 
step. The zone based hazard data produced by SMARTFIRE is then imported into the 
railEXODUS model into corresponding spatial zones. Within the railEXODUS model, when 
agents are considered to be standing, they are exposed to the hazards at head height; when the 
occupants elect to crawl, they are exposed to the hazards at knee height.  
 
SIMULATION SET UP 
 
Fire simulations 
 
Each car in the four car train used in this study has interior dimensions of 2.6 m (wide) by 2.1 
m (high) by 20 m (long).  The side doors have dimensions of 1.2 m by 1.95 m while the end 
cab door has dimensions of 0.8 m by 1.9 m.  Train windows are usually made of laminated 
safety glass.  When laminated window glass fractures, the broken fragments of glass will 
remain bond to the plastic interlayer under normal conditions [3].  Therefore, for simplicity, 
and as assumed in [3], the windows are assumed not to fall out in the present simulations.  
Thus the only venting of hot fire effluent into the tunnel is via any open doors. The section of 
tunnel modelled is 120 m long and 4.6 m (wide) by 4.0 m (high) (Fig. 4). The curved tunnel 
ceiling and side walls are represented by 0.1 m thick bricks.  The 80 m long train is assumed 
to be 20 m into the tunnel.   
 
The ignition sources are the two-luggage fire with and without accelerant shown in Fig. 2. 
The volume of the ignition source is 0.5 m (wide) by 0.5 m (high) by 1.5 m (long) and is 
located on the floor beside three seats in Car 3 (Fig. 4). The material properties used in the 
simulations are presented in Table 2 and are the same used in [3] for the Singapore Circle 
Line rail stock unless indicated otherwise. The main interior combustible materials and the 
luggage fuel for the ignition source are assumed to have the molecular structure of Polyester, 
i.e., C5.77H6.25O1.63. Heat release rates measured under various levels of irradiance from cone 
calorimeter experiments are the inputs of the flame spread model.  Cone calorimeter data 
under a heat flux of 25 kW/m2 for carpet, 35 kW/m2 for seats and 50 kW/m2 for walls are 
appropriate in numerical simulations of train fires [3, 23]. The HRR curves of seats and 
carpet presented in Fig. 5 are those used for the Singapore Circle Line rail stock [3] and the 
HRR curve for walls is from [23].  The lateral flame spread rates are 0.0018 m/s for the seats 
and the walls and 0.003 m/s for the carpets, which are the upper limits for underground train 
materials according to British standard BS 6853 [2].  Due to the lack of a requirement for the 
upward flame spread rates within the standard, 0.0033 m/s is used for all materials, which is 
the value for common aircraft panels [15]. Yields of combustion products are supposed to 
depend on the equivalence ratio and the yields against equivalence ratio have formulas 
derived by Tewarson in [24] for polystyrene, but the yields of species at well ventilated 
conditions are replaced with those for Polyester.  
 
 
Fig. 4. CFD representation of the train inside the tunnel (left) and part of the train with the 
ignition source (right).  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. HRRs of interior materials from cone calorimeter experiments.  
 
 
Table 2. Material properties [3].  
 Density (kg/m3) Conductivity 
(W/mK) 
Specific Heat 
(J/kg) 
Ignition 
temperature (OC) 
FRP Polyester 1795 0.295 1673.5 448 
Styrene butadiene 1478 0.19 1987.5 419 
Wall panel 548a 0.11a 2500a 648 
Glass 1380 0.049 0.84 -- 
a Data from [23]. 
 
Mesh sensitivity studies are undertaken within a single car as it would require a prohibitive 
amount of time to simulate a fire within the entire train with very fine meshes.  Non-uniform 
meshes consisting of 90,729 and 205,020 cells for a single car are used in the mesh sensitivity 
study. The almost identical predicted temperatures at 1.7 m above the floor at the centre of 
the car for the two different mesh scenarios suggest that meshes consisting of 90,729 cells be 
adequate for the train car fire simulations.  The entire computational domain of the four-car 
train and the 120 m long tunnel consists of 602,805 cells.  Figure 4 is the CFD representation 
of the train inside the tunnel and part of the train with the ignition source.  
 
The time step size used in the simulations is 2 seconds. A 600 seconds fire is simulated for 
scenarios with the side passenger doors open while 1200 seconds of fire is simulated for 
scenarios with the end cab doors open.  
 
Evacuation simulations 
 
It is assumed that there are a total of 715 passengers in the fully loaded four-car train.  This 
population is distributed between the cars as follows; 172 agents in the car of fire origin, and 
181 agents in each of the non-fire cars and randomly distributed within each car.  Within the 
car of fire origin, agents are not placed near the location of fire initiation. Other passenger 
attributes assume the standard railEXODUS default values with a response time distribution 
of 0 to 30 seconds.  In cases with the half loaded train, a total of 360 agents are used and are 
distributed as follows; 84 agents in the car of fire origin and 92 agents in each of the non-fire 
cars. In the OWG scenarios, agents are allowed to move from car to car. In the ID scenarios, 
the internal doors are closed when the side passenger doors are used for evacuation. In 
scenarios in which the end cab doors are used for evacuation, each internal door is assumed 
to be initially open and is closed after the last surviving agent passes through it. The times to 
close the internal doors are a result of the interaction between the fire and evacuation 
dynamics.   
 
The door flow rate is an essential parameter determining the evacuation efficiency. The 
conventional train internal door only allows one agent to pass through at a time.  The width at 
the bottom of the OWG connecting cars is 1.2 m (see Fig. 1).  This is considered to be 
sufficiently wide to allow two people to pass through simultaneously.  Passenger exit flow 
rates from the rail car to the track side can be extremely slow as passengers must negotiate a 
greater than 1 m drop from the car door sill to the ground.  Non-emergency detraining 
incidents have produced exit flows of as low as 5 persons/minute with populations involving 
the elderly people and children [1, 25].  Evacuation trials involving young students have 
achieved exit flows of approximately 20 persons/minute through side doors, while other trials 
using end doors have achieved average flows of 10 persons/minute [1].  In this study, a 
maximum flow of 10 persons/minute is assumed for the narrow cab end door and 20 
persons/minute for the wide car side doors.   
 
In scenarios involving car side doors, it is assumed that the tunnel is only sufficiently wide to 
allow doors on one side of the tunnel to open and that there is a 0.6 m wide walkway running 
along the tunnel side wall (See Fig. 6). The walkway is wide enough to allow agents to walk 
in single file. In these scenarios, passengers step down onto the walkway from train cars and 
walk in one direction towards the front of the train. In scenarios with the side doors closed, 
passengers step down onto the ground through the end doors located at either end of the train. 
As the fire hazards exit the rail car, they rise to the ceiling of the tunnel.  Furthermore, as the 
agents exit the rail cars, they drop 1 m below the floor of the rail cars to the walkway/ground.  
As a result, with the exception of thermal radiation, the fire hazards within the tunnel are well 
above head height and so the agents experience a low level of fire hazards while in the tunnel. 
While the end of the tunnel is 20 m from either end of the train, agents are assumed to have 
reached a place of relative safety when they have travelled 4 m from the end of the train. 
Thus the end of the evacuation sequence for each agent is considered not when they have 
exited the train but when they have reached a place of relative safety - 4 m from the end of 
the train.  It is noted that agents may still be incapacitated due to exposure to fire effluent 
while in the tunnel before they reach the place of relative safety.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Passenger evacuation flow with (a) side car doors open and (b) cab end doors open. 
 
Passenger behaviour has been simplified in the evacuation simulations. Firstly, passenger 
response times are randomly generated between 0 and 30 seconds after the start of the fire, 
without considering the impact of visual access to the incident – which may increase or 
decrease response times.  It is also assumed that there is no passenger intervention to suppress 
the fire.  Furthermore, while passenger walking speeds assume the standard railEXODUS 
distribution (each passenger has a different walking speed) it is assumed that there are no 
mobility impaired passengers and it is further assumed that passengers are not hindered by 
luggage.  It is also noted that the simplifying assumptions apply equally to both the OWG and 
ID scenarios.  
 
For each scenario, 100 repetitions of the evacuation simulation are performed and the average 
result for the scenario is then determined. It should be noted that an agent that is incapacitated 
is considered a fatality as rescue is not considered in these simulations.  
  
SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
This analysis has involved 10 fire scenarios and 16 coupled fire and evacuation scenarios.  
Clearly this generates a significant amount of simulation data, too much to report in detail in 
this paper.  Rather than present the full details of the fire and evacuation analysis this paper 
focuses on the key results that are important in differentiating the impact that the competing 
train configurations have on fire safety and survivability. Flashover is generally considered to 
mark the end of survivable conditions for occupants within a fire enclosure and has been used 
as a criterion to assess fire safety in some studies of train car fires [3, 4]. Therefore, in the 
section ‘Fire Simulation Results’, the predicted HRRs – which is an indicator of the onset of 
flashover - for each scenario are presented. However, simply considering the onset of 
flashover is not sufficient to assess the life safety potential offered by the alternative designs. 
It is also essential to determine whether the exposed population can safely evacuate from the 
train during the developing fire. These results are presented in the sub-section ‘Coupled Fire 
and Simulation Results’.  The main results presented in this section are the number of 
predicted incapacitations generated in each scenario, from which the 
advantages/shortcomings of different car configurations are evaluated. Additional details 
useful in explaining the main findings such as hazard distributions and observed evacuation 
dynamics are presented in the section ‘Further Analysis’.  
  
Fire Simulation Results 
 
The predicted heat release rates from the burning of train interior materials for all fire 
scenarios are depicted in Fig. 7.  The minimum level of HRR for flashover in ISO 9705 room 
tests is 1000 kW [26]. However, the volume of a train car is much greater than the ISO 9705 
test room. Thus it is reasonable to assume that a higher heat release rate would be required to 
indicate that flashover has occurred.  Here we take flashover to be indicated by a rapid 
increase in the predicted heat release rate and the time to flashover to be arbitrarily defined as 
the time at which the heat release rate exceeds 2000 KW within the train car. Therefore, for 
scenarios with the OWG configuration (Scenarios S1, S3, S5 and S7), flashover is unlikely to 
occur, based on these criteria. The maximum predicted peak HRR from the burning of train 
interior materials is approximately 250 kW occurring in Scenario S7 for the arson fire with 
only the end cab doors open for evacuation. Scenario S1 is similar to the fire simulation in the 
work by Ting et al [4] with the same ignition source and with the side doors open for 
ventilation. In this scenario, the predicted peak HRR is less than 120 kW during the 600 
seconds simulation time. At this fire’s peak, the car materials contribute an additional 24% to 
the peak heat released by the ignition source. This result is consistent with the finding from 
the work by Ting et al [4], in which they calculated an additional heat increase of 20%. For 
the ID configuration, flashover is unlikely to occur too for scenarios with the car side doors 
open (Scenarios S2 and S6) with similar HRR curves as the scenarios for the OWG 
configuration. The two car separation configurations, OWG and ID, have minimal effect on 
the burning of train interior materials when the car side doors are open.   
 
However, for the ID configuration, flashover is predicted to occur within the fire car for 
scenarios in which only the end cab doors can be opened into the tunnel. The predicted HRRs 
reach 2000 kW at 780 seconds in Scenario S4a, at 480 seconds in Scenario 4b, at 435 seconds 
in Scenario S8a and at 395 seconds in Scenario S8b respectively. The times to flashover are 
different for S4a and S4b and for S8a and S8b because the doors between cars are open for 
different durations due to the difference in the number of agents moving between cars. For 
example with the accidental fire, in Scenario S4a the cars are fully loaded and so the inter-car 
doors remain open for longer than in S4b in which the cars are only half loaded.  In Scenario 
S4a (fully loaded) the doors between the car of fire origin and Car 4 and between the car of 
fire origin and Car 2 are closed at 300 seconds and 420 seconds respectively (see Table 3).  In 
contrast, in Scenario S4b (half loaded) the two inter-car doors are closed at 20 seconds and at 
110 seconds respectively. The earlier closure of the inter-car doors in S4b results in the 
earlier occurrence of flashover within the car of fire origin compared with Scenario S4a.  
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Fig. 7. Predicted HRRs from combustion of train interior materials for (a) the accidental fire 
scenarios and (b) the arson fire scenarios.  
 
Table 3. Time to close the internal car doors in the ID configuration scenarios with the end 
cab door open.  
Scenario Between Cars 1-2 (s) Between Cars 2-3 (s) Between Cars 3-4 (s) 
S4a >1200 420 300 
S4b 720 110 20 
S8a 300 120 60 
S8b 300 110 20 
 
For scenarios with the train side doors open, both the OWG and the ID configurations result 
in only the seat bases near the fire source being involved in the fire. This means that the 
ignition source fire burns out without significant involvement of the car contents. However, 
for scenarios with the end cab door open, large differences in the burning areas between the 
two different train car separation configurations are predicted. As seen in Fig. 8, at the end of 
the simulation of the 1200 seconds fire in Scenario S3, only the seats near the fire source and 
the adjacent wall are involved in the fire (each black dot within the three-dimensional figures 
represents a computational cell which has been consumed by the fire). In contrast, most of the 
interior fittings within the car of fire origin are burnt out at 450 seconds in Scenario S4b. 
 
From the predicted HRR and the burnt state of the train interior materials, we arrive at the 
same conclusion as in [4], namely that the use of flame retardant materials which are 
compliant with BS6853 Cat 1a prevents flashover and the uncontrolled spread of fire to 
adjacent cars for the OWG configuration. And the OWG configuration produces improved 
fire results in the car of fire origin compared to the conventional configuration. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Predicted burning locations at 1200s for Scenarios (a) S3 and (b) S4b. 
 
Coupled Fire and Evacuation Simulation Results 
 
Before presenting the results of the coupled fire and evacuation analysis it is useful to 
determine required safe egress times (RSET) for the train as a whole and individual cars for a 
fully loaded train without fire hazards.  When the train doors on one side are available for 
evacuation, it requires approximately 370 seconds, 435 seconds, 450 seconds and 470 
seconds to empty Car 1, Car 2, Car 3 and Car 4 respectively. The differences in evacuation 
time for the different internal configurations are negligible as all the agents are using only the 
car side doors for evacuation.  The  RSET times increase for each car as the external 
evacuation flow is in one direction (see Fig. 6) and congestion develops along the side 
walkway (Fig. 14) making it difficult for agents to exit the cars.  Thus the RSET for the train 
as a whole is 470 seconds.  When only the train end cab doors are available for evacuation, 
the total evacuation time is approximately 3000 seconds, again irrespective of the nature of 
the internal layout.  This is because the evacuation time is severely limited by the restricted 
flow through the two cab end doors.   It requires 1310 seconds and 1341 seconds to empty 
Car 3 (Fire Car) for the OWG and ID car separation respectively.   
 
The evacuation results under the impact of fire hazards from each corresponding fire scenario 
are presented in Table 4. All the predicted incapacitations are due to excessive heat exposure 
(FIH =1.0) while the severe injuries are due to a combination of heat and toxic gas exposure.  
Amongst the severe injuries, agents either had FIH greater than 0.5 or a combination of FIH 
and FIN greater than 0.5. 
 
The evacuation time presented in Table 4 is taken as the time for the last surviving agent to 
reach a place of relative safety.  It is noted that in all cases, the evacuation times for cases 
using the side doors are significantly lower than those using the cab end doors.  This is to be 
expected as the flow through a side door is twice that of an end door and there are eight 
usable side doors compared to only two usable end doors.  However, the difference in 
evacuation time for side door versus end door is not consistent between OWG and ID 
configurations.  This is due to the number of incapacitations occurring in the various 
scenarios.  There are always more incapacitations when only the cab end doors are available 
compared to the case when the side doors are available irrespective of internal configuration, 
and with one exception (half load population, accidental fire, side doors available), there are 
always more incapacitations occurring for the OWG configuration compared to the ID 
configuration, irrespective of exit availability.  
 
With the car side doors open for evacuation, the scenarios with OWG configuration (S1a, S1b, 
S5a, S5b) produce similar evacuation times to the corresponding scenarios with the ID 
configuration (S2a, S2b, S6a, S6b).  However, when only the end cab doors are available for 
evacuation, the scenarios with OWG configuration (S3a, S3b, S7a, S7b) produce evacuation 
times that are much shorter than that for the corresponding scenarios with the ID 
configuration (S4a, S4b, S8a, S8b).  The reason for the shorter evacuation times in the OWG 
configuration is not the result of a more efficient movement of passengers from car to car, but 
is due to there being fewer survivors compared to the scenarios with the ID configuration. For 
example, in Scenario S3b the half loaded OWG configuration produces an evacuation time of 
1419 seconds, which is 13% shorter than the corresponding 1624 seconds required by the 
equivalent ID configuration in Scenario S4b.  However, in Scenario S3b there are 67.6 
incapacitations compared with 0 in Scenario S4b. 
 
Table 4. Average evacuation statistics for all scenarios.  
 Scenario Population 
load 
Evacuation 
time (s) 
Severe injuries 
(survivors with 
 1>FED > 0.5) 
Total No. of 
incapacitations 
(FED=1)/ % 
No. of 
incapacitations 
within tunnel 
 Accidental Fire      
Side 
doors 
open 
S1a (OWG) 715 743 59.0 73.7 / 10.3% 3.6 
S2a (ID) 715 666 6.8 49.1 / 7% 1.6 
S1b (OWG) 360 285 0 0 0 
S2b (ID) 360 290 0 0 0 
Only 
end 
cab  
doors 
open 
S3a (OWG) 715 1448 77.9 419.7 / 59% 0.4 
S4a (ID) 715 2356 67.0 185.6 / 26% 0 
S3b (OWG) 360 1419 71.6 67.6 / 19% 0.4 
S4b (ID) 360 1624 0 0 0 
 Arson Fire      
Side 
doors 
open 
S5a (OWG) 715 666 27.5 254.7 / 36% 6.3 
S6a (ID) 715 530 9.2 136.5 / 19% 1.0 
S5b (OWG) 360 432 12.3 32.8 / 9% 3.8 
S6b (ID) 360 310 6.0 29.2 / 8% 1.3 
Only 
end 
cab 
doors 
open 
S7a (OWG) 715 917 70.5 549.9 / 77% 0.5 
S8a (ID) 715 2364 140.0 171.0 / 24% 0 
S7b (OWG) 360 910 70.0 194.3 / 54% 0.3 
S8b (ID) 360 1549 12.7 22.0 / 6% 0 
 
Among the eight pairs of the scenarios, only one pair, S1b and S2b (the accidental fire with 
the side doors open for evacuation and half passenger load) produce no incapacitations or 
severe injuries for both train car separation configurations. In all other scenario pairings the 
OWG configuration results in a greater number of incapacitations than the conventional ID 
configuration. The scenario producing the least additional incapacitations in the OWG 
configuration is S5b (the arson fire with the half loaded population and with the side doors 
open) which results in 32.8 incapacitations, 3.6 more than in the ID case (S6b). The scenario 
producing the greatest number of additional incapacitations is S7a (the arson fire with the 
fully loaded population and with the end cab doors open) which results in 549.9 
incapacitations, 378.9 or at least 221% more incapacitations than in the ID case (S8a). 
 
For the accidental fire, the scenario involving fully loaded cars with the cab end doors used 
for evacuation with OWG configuration (S3a) produces the highest number of incapacitations 
(419.7) and the greatest proportion of fatalities 59%.  Similarly, for the arson fire, the same 
configuration produces the highest number of incapacitations (549.9) and results in the 
greatest proportion of fatalities 77%. 
 
The OWG configuration also generally results in more passengers with severe injuries than 
the ID configuration except for the arson fire with the fully loaded population and with the 
end cab doors open for evacuation. In this situation, the OWG configuration (Scenario S7a) 
results in 70.5 severe injuries while the ID configuration (Scenario S8a) results in 140.0 
injuries. However, the total number of casualties (severe injuries plus incapacitations) in 
Scenario S7a is 620.4, more than twice as much as in Scenario S8a (309.4).  
 
While the fire in the car of fire origin within the OWG case may appear to be less severe than 
in the ID configuration, when the impact of the fire hazards on evacuation is considered, the 
OWG configuration results in a significantly greater number of predicted casualties and so is 
considered to be less safe than the ID configuration for the scenarios considered.  
 
It is also noted that virtually all of the incapacitations occur within the rail cars. Very few 
incapacitations occur within the tunnel (see Table 4).  Furthermore, those incapacitations that 
occur in the tunnel occur immediately the agent exits the rail car and so are not caused by 
conditions within the tunnel. 
 
 
Further Analysis 
 
While the fire simulations demonstrate that the OWG train car separation configuration 
successfully reduces the spread of fire over the train material surfaces (seats and walls) and 
delays (prevents) the onset of flashover, the evacuation simulations demonstrate that for the 
fire and exit scenarios considered, it results in considerably more casualties and so is 
significantly less safe than the conventional ID configuration. These counterintuitive findings 
are explained in this section through further analysis of the complex coupling between the 
fire and evacuation dynamics.   
 
Firstly, the OWG configuration compromises the concept of a place of relative safety on 
board the train even in the situation with the side doors open for evacuation (S1, S2, S5 and 
S6).  In fire Scenario S1 and S2, the two car separation configurations, OWG and ID, have 
minimal effect on the burning of train interior materials (See Fig. 7a). However, the spread of 
the fire effluent within the train and its impact on the evacuating passengers are quite 
different. As seen in Fig. 9, the head height temperature in the car of fire origin (Car 3) in 
Scenario S2 (ID) has a peak value of 209 OC at 440 seconds. This temperature is higher than 
the critical value of 185 OC, exposed to which the time to incapacitation is only one minute 
[21].  The car of fire origin in Scenario S1 (OWG) has a peak temperature of 182 OC, which 
is only 13% lower than that in the ID case.  However, the peak temperature in Car 4 in the 
OWG case (Scenario S1) is as high as 135 OC, which is much higher than the near ambient 
temperature in the ID case (Scenario S2). It is noted that it requires approximately 450-470 
seconds to empty Car 3 and Car 4 even without the impact of fire hazards. The lengthy 
evacuation time is due to the relatively low exit flow rate to the ground via the side doors 
compounded by the congestion on the side walkway in the tunnel. As a result, it is not 
surprising that many of the incapacitations are originally located in this non-fire car in 
Scenario S1a (OWG) while the incapacitations in Scenario S2a (ID) are localised in the car of 
fire origin only (Fig. 10).   
 
 
Fig. 9. Predicted head height temperatures in the centre of the fire car (Car 3) and Car 4 from 
Scenario S1 and S2.   
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Starting locations (open squares) of the predicted incapacitations in a single 
evacuation simulation of (a) S1a and (b) S2a. 
 
Secondly, the agents cannot always take full advantage of the OWG configuration to enable 
the free movement of passengers between cars, in the event of a fire. In the OWG scenarios 
with open side doors for evacuation, the number of agents that move between cars is quite 
small (see Table 5).  This is due to the high population density within the cars and the 
availability of exits to the outside in each car. As seen in Table 5, an average of 10.5 agents 
move from the car of fire origin to Car 4 and an average of 24.0 agents move to Car 2 in the 
high density population case with the accidental fire (Scenario S1a).  Also with the high 
population density, the number of agents moving from the car of fire origin to its 
neighbouring cars in Scenario S5a in the arson fire is even less. In the lower population 
density cases, even fewer agents move between cars as the exit queues are sufficiently short 
for most agents to exit the train from the car where they are originally located.  
 
Table 5. Average evacuation statistics for agents moving between cars for scenarios with 
OWG configuration.  
Scenario From Car 2 to Car 1 From Car 3 to Car 2 From Car 3 to Car 4 
S1a 13.6 24.0 10.5 
S1b 4 11 5 
S5a 13.7 6.3 4.4 
S5b 4 11 5.7 
 
Thirdly, when only the end cab doors are available for evacuation, the OWG configuration 
places passengers in non-fire cars at a greater risk of injury in the event of fire. The 
discussion here is only based on the accidental fire scenario as the arson fire produces even 
worse fire hazards. In situations where it is not possible to open the car side doors for 
evacuation, flashover is prevented from occurring in the OWG configuration (Scenario S3) 
whereas in the ID configuration (Scenario S4a) flashover can occur within the car of fire 
origin after approximately 450 seconds. The initial fire development in Scenario S3 and 
Scenario S4a are similar (Fig. 11). However, once the doors to the fire car are closed in 
Scenario S4a, the upper layer temperature (Fig. 11a) and hot layer depth increase rapidly. As 
a result, the fire starts to spread to the interior materials of the fire car. It is not surprising that 
the predicted head height temperatures in the centre of the car of fire origin in Scenario S4a 
(ID) are significantly higher than those in Scenario S3 (OWG) after the internal door between 
the fire car and Car 4 is closed at 300 seconds (Fig. 11a). However, the predicted head height 
temperatures in the centre of each non-fire car in Scenario S4a are significantly lower than 
those in Scenario S3, especially after 500 seconds. The trends for the predicted CO 
concentrations at head height are similar to those for temperature (Fig. 11b). As the 
evacuation is limited by the occupant flow at the two cab doors, agents cannot benefit from 
the improved access between cars offered by the OWG configuration. This is demonstrated 
by considering the time to clear Car 3 in situations without fire.  In the OWG configuration, 
the time to clear Car 3 is only 31 seconds or 2.3% faster than in the ID configuration, with 
approximately 1300 seconds being required to clear the car. Furthermore, the OWG 
configuration creates a free path for the fire effluent to move between cars making the non-
fire cars untenable sooner than in the case of the conventional car configuration.  As a result, 
almost all the agents in the car of fire origin and most of the agents in Car 2 and Car 4 
become incapacitated in Scenario S3a (see Fig. 12). In contrast to the hazardous environment 
in Scenario S3, the temperatures and CO concentrations in the non-fire cars in Scenario S4a 
are considerably lower. As a result, only the agents in the car of fire origin and a small 
number of agents in Car 4 are incapacitated. In the car of fire origin, seven agents survive and 
move into neighboring cars before the internal doors to the fire car are closed in Scenario S4a.   
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Fig. 11. Predicted head height (a) temperatures and (b) CO concentrations in the centre of 
each car from Scenario S3 and S4a.   
 
 
Fig. 12. Starting locations (open squares) of the predicted incapacitation in a single 
evacuation simulation of (a) S3a and (b) S4a. 
 
 
Finally, while the time to flashover is generally considered to mark the end of the 
survivability period for those passengers still remaining in the car of fire origin, flashover is 
not the determining factor for survivability in the scenarios investigated in this study. Firstly, 
for all the scenarios involving the ID configuration, flashover occurs after the last survivor 
originally located in the car of fire origin exits the car and shuts the door behind them.  For 
example, in Scenario 8a (ID), time to flashover is 435 seconds based on a HRR criterion of 2 
MW as defined in this study.   A more conservative time to flashover is 345 seconds, based 
on a flashover criterion of 1 MW as determined in the ISO 9705 room fire test [26], or 330 
seconds using another conservative flashover criterion based on the upper layer temperature 
exceeding  600 OC.    However, in this scenario, the last survivor in the car of fire origin (Car 
3) has exited the car and closed the door at 120 seconds, well before flashover occurs.  
Secondly, at the time the doors to the car of fire origin are closed, both OWG and ID 
configurations result in similar numbers of incapacitations. For example, at the time both 
doors to the car of fire origin are closed, 97% of the 172 passengers originally located in the 
car of fire origin have been incapacitated in Scenario 8a (ID). In contrast, in Scenario 7a 
(OWG) at the same time, 94% of the 172 passengers have been incapacitated in the car of fire 
origin. Therefore, the survivability within the car of fire origin is not determined by the time 
to flashover for both OWG and ID configurations. Thus it is not appropriate to use flashover 
as the sole indicator for fire safety assessment for underground trains – as suggested in earlier 
studies [3, 4].  
 
CAR SEPARATION EVALUATION 
 
A critical fire safety criterion for a rail car configuration is that the passengers can safely 
evacuate from the train in the event of a fire. The evacuation efficiencies in terms of the 
number of incapacitations for an underground train within a tunnel with the OWG and ID 
configurations have been compared in the previous section for an accidental luggage fire 
scenario and an arson fire scenario involving accelerants for ignition. The numbers of 
predicted incapacitations resulting from each scenario are compared in Fig. 13. It is clear that 
the conventional ID configuration results in a significantly safer evacuation performance than 
the OWG configuration in virtually all cases investigated in this study.   
 
For the accidental fire, in the half loaded population scenario, all the agents in the ID 
configuration can safely evacuate if side doors or end cab doors are used.  In this case agents 
in the OWG configuration can safely evacuate only if the side doors are available.  If only the 
cab end doors are available for evacuation, on average 68 incapacitations may be caused.  In 
scenarios in which the train is fully loaded, both configurations result in predicted 
incapacitations.  However, the OWG configuration results in a significantly greater number 
of incapacitations, generating 50% more in the case of a side door evacuation and 126% more 
in the case of a cab end door evacuation.  Clearly, the scenario in which only the cab end 
doors are available for evacuation (narrow tunnel) is the most challenging for both 
configurations. For the arson fire, the OWG configuration again produces significantly 
greater incapacitations than the conventional ID configuration for all scenarios.  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Fig. 13. Number of predicted incapacitations resulting from an (a) the accidental fire and (b) 
the arson fire for the OWG and ID configurations with fully loaded and half loaded 
populations.  
 
 
It is noted that for the fully loaded ID configuration with only the cab end doors available for 
evacuation, the number of predicted incapacitations decreases as the HRR of the fire is 
increased from that of the accidental fire (S4a) to the arson fire (S8a). This result is 
counterintuitive as it is expected that as the HRR of the fire increases, there will be a greater 
number of incapacitations – as indeed there are in all the other scenarios.  This result is due to 
the earlier closure of the doors either side of the car of fire origin in S8a (arson fire) 
compared to S4a (accidental fire) as shown in Table 3. Within the car of fire origin almost all 
of the agents are incapacitated within the car for both fire scenarios.  However, with the less 
severe fire (S4a), the number of incapacitations within the car of fire origin is slightly lower 
on average and the incapacitations occur later compared with scenario S8a.  Thus for the less 
severe fire, there are slightly more agents that survive on average and they survive for longer 
and so prolong the time at which the connecting doors remain open.  As a result (of the 
greater survivor rate and survivor duration) a greater volume of fire effluent is able to spread 
to the neighbouring cars resulting in a greater incapacitation rate compared to the case with 
the larger fire. Thus the greater survival rate within the car of fire origin results in a greater 
incapacitation rate elsewhere in the train. 
 
The key factors which contribute to the predicted number of incapacitations are the exiting 
flow of agents and the spread of fire effluent throughout the train. The exit flow is very low 
for both configurations due to the nature of the exit, involving a greater than 1.0 m drop from 
the rail car to the ground.  If this could be improved with a better exiting mechanism, the 
number of incapacitations in both cases would be significantly reduced.  The spread of fire 
effluent from the fire car to the neighbouring cars is directly affected by the nature of the car 
separation. In the case of the OWG cars the fire effluent is free to move between cars which 
will directly impact the ability of passenger to evacuate, a point not fully considered in the 
earlier fire analyses [3, 4] which did not include a coupled fire-evacuation analysis. While the 
OWG configuration allows easier movement of passengers between cars, in the fully loaded 
scenario, passengers cannot take the full advantage of this feature in the event of a fire and 
are significantly disadvantaged as they are exposed to much greater fire hazards in the OWG 
cars than in the ID cars.   
 
For the situation of a train in a narrow tunnel, it is assumed in the above analysis that only the 
cab end doors are open and used for evacuation (worst door availability).  While the side 
doors cannot be opened for evacuation, they may be opened for ventilation by passengers 
stuck in the cars. This case is evaluated for a fully loaded OWG configuration where the cab 
end doors are used for evacuation but the car side doors are opened for ventilation - Scenario 
S9. For simplicity, it is assumed that the doors on one side can be fully opened making the 
fire development in S9 in an OWG train similar to that in either S1 or S5 in which side doors 
are open for both ventilation and evacuation, depending on the type of the ignition source.  
This then creates a more survivable fire environment than those in either S3a or S7a with 
only the end cab doors open. Thus, the evacuation outcomes of S9 for an OWG configuration 
are expected to be worse than either S1a or S5a but better than those in either S3a or S7a. 
Evacuation simulations for S9 for the OWG configuration with the accidental fire produce an 
average of 270.3 incapacitations, less than that in S3a as expected, but still significantly 
higher than the number in the worst accident fire case for the ID configuration (185.6, 
Scenario S4a)). For the arson fire, the number of incapacitations in S9 is expected to be 
greater than that in S5a (254.7) (the least deadly arson fire case for OWG configuration), 
which is already much higher than the number in the worst arson fire case for the ID 
configuration (171 in S8a).  Therefore, for a train with fully loaded population in a narrow 
tunnel, the OWG is expected to produce more incapacitations than those with the ID 
configuration in this particular evacuation situation.     
 
A possible mitigation to improve the performance of the OWG configuration is the 
installation of a fire suppression system within the train. A potentially less complex solution 
would involve the installation of either fire doors which could be automatically deployed in 
the event of a fire or the installation of a passenger operated fire curtain.  The later would rely 
on passengers correctly deploying the curtain.  It is noted that the conventional configuration 
is also reliant on the last passenger to pass into a neighbouring car to close the door behind 
them. 
 
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
As in any numerical simulation of a complex process, there are many possible scenarios that 
can be examined.  It is not practical to investigate all the possible scenarios that may be of 
interest and so the conclusions derived from this study are limited to the scenarios 
investigated.  Furthermore, it is important to take into considered the nature of the 
assumptions required to simplify the analysis when reviewing the findings and conclusions.  
Here we list some of the known limitations of the work presented in this paper. 
 
 A scenario in which both the left and right side doors are available for evacuation was 
not considered in this study.  This scenario is expected to be the most survivable for 
both the OWG and ID configurations and so the least challenging and of least interest.  
Survival rates are expected to be better than those for the case with the side doors 
available on only one side. 
 
 All the scenarios examined considered evacuation within a tunnel. Scenarios 
involving evacuation within a station were not considered as these are considered to 
be less challenging than those for Scenario 1, 2, 5 and 6 in which the side doors on 
one side of the train are available.  When the train is at a station platform, the exit 
flow through each of the train side doors will be greater than when the train is in the 
tunnel as the passengers can simply walk out of the train onto the platform and do not 
have to descend to the ground.  Furthermore, with the train in the station, the fire 
dynamics within the train cars may be different to that in the tunnel due to the 
different ventilation conditions and the evacuation of the passengers from the 
platform would also need to be considered. This would introduce another set of 
factors considered beyond the scope of this study. 
 
 Only two types of ignition sources are considered in the fire simulations, a slowly 
developing luggage fire and an accelerant driven luggage fire with a peak HRR 
around 500 kW. As an ignition source of between 25 and 200 kW is required to 
promote significant fire spread within trains [8], the use of smaller ignition sources 
may not result in fires as severe as those examined in this paper, and so the 
differences in survivability resulting from the OWG and ID configurations may not be 
as significant as suggested in this study. Conversely, for larger ignition sources, such 
as may result from a terrorist incident on an underground train, the suggested 
differences in survivability may be more pronounced.  
 
 The results for the scenarios with the conventional internal door configuration (ID) 
are reliant on the assumption that the internal doors, in particular the doors of the car 
of fire origin, are intact and are closed after the last passenger exits into the 
neighbouring car. The complete closure of the doors to the fire cars is critical to the 
conclusions of this study. If the doors to the fire car are not completely closed or there 
is leakage, the fire effluent would spread to the adjacent cars and possibly produce 
more incapacitations than those predicted in this study for the ID configuration.  
Furthermore, if the doors are fully closed, but are  closed at a time later than that used 
in the simulations, this will also impact the number of incapacitations.  
 
 Ventilation of the rail cars was restricted only to certain car doors being open.  While 
this situation was the same for both the OWG and ID configurations examined, it was 
most severely restricted in the scenarios with only the end doors open for evacuation 
i.e. S3, S4, S7 and S8 – which are the scenarios that resulted in the greatest number of 
incapacitations.  It is possible that windows within the car of fire origin may break 
due to the fire, car doors could be opened even if they could not be used for 
evacuation and windows may be broken by the occupants, all of which would increase 
the ventilation within the cars.  The improved ventilation is likely to have two effects.  
First it will reduce the volume of fire effluent within the train, allowing more of the 
fire effluent to be vented into the tunnel and out of the train making conditions more 
survivable within the train.  This is likely to have the greatest positive impact on the 
survivability within the OWG train with the end doors used for evacuation.  The 
additional scenario S9 partially addressed this case where all the doors on one side of 
the train were open, hence allowing for greater ventilation, even though they could 
not be used for evacuation.  For the accidental fire this resulted in a 36% reduction in 
the number of incapacitations compared to S3a, but still resulted in 270 
incapacitations or 38% of the occupants. While not examined in this paper, it is 
expected that if both sets of doors were open, the conditions and hence survivability 
would be improved still further.   
 
The second impact of improved ventilation is that the fire within the car of fire origin 
is expected not to grow as fast or to reach the same peak HRR output.  For example, 
in Figure 7a compare the heat release rate of the fires in the case of the ID 
configuration subjected to the accidental fire with the side doors open (S2) – 
producing high ventilation – and with only the car end doors open (S4) – producing 
poor ventilation.  As can be seen, the case with higher ventilation (S2) results in the 
smaller fire. For the case with the ID configuration it is not possible to determine 
whether this will result in fewer or greater incapacitations without performing coupled 
fire and evacuation simulations as the doors from the car of fire origin will be open 
for longer (as there are more survivors in the car of fire origin) which means more of 
the fire effluent will spread to the neighbouring cars.  Conversely, for the OWG 
configuration, improved ventilation will reduce the size of the fire and hence reduce 
the amount of fire effluent available to spread to other cars and so is likely to reduce 
the number of incapacitations.  However, it is not possible to determine the magnitude 
of the expected benefit without undertaking additional coupled fire and evacuation 
simulations. 
 
 The impact of forced ventilation within the tunnel is not considered within this study.  
This is not expected to have a major impact on the findings of the study as it is the 
same for both train configurations, and as shown in Table 4 the vast majority of 
incapacitations occur within the train.  
 
 The place of safety is only considered to be 4m away from either end of the train.  In 
reality, passengers may be expected to walk greater distances to reach safety, either a 
station or the tunnel exit.  However, the main purpose of this study was to consider 
the impact of train configuration on survivability and so the study was primarily 
concerned with the analysis up to the point the passengers had exited the train.  
Furthermore, results suggest that conditions within the tunnel in the immediate 
vicinity of the train are survivable.  However, it is interesting to note that considerable 
congestion develops along the narrow walkway as passengers exiting the train delay 
passengers already on the walkway (see Figure 14).  In some situations this could be a 
significant factor resulting in delaying the passengers reaching a place of relative 
safety.  
 
 The combustion model for the gaseous fuel assumes that the fire only self-
extinguishes when the available O2 or fuel runs out. Thus for the ID scenarios, the 
HRR in the fire car after the internal doors are closed may be over-predicted as the 
fire continues to burn even though the O2 level may be insufficient to sustain flaming 
combustion. However, this modelling limitation does not affect the derived number of 
incapacitations in this study or the main conclusions. This is because, no survivors are 
in the fire car when its internal doors are closed; and because the impact of the fire 
hazards from the fire car (only heat transfer through the car walls/doors via 
conduction) on passengers in the tunnel and other cars are negligible.  
 
 Passenger behaviour in the evacuation simulations has been simplified so that the 
passenger population does not contain passengers with mobility impairments, luggage 
does not hinder the movement of passengers, the passenger response time is not 
impacted by visual access to the incident and there is no passenger intervention to 
suppress the fire.  However, it is noted that the imposed passenger behaviour is the 
same for both the OWG and ID evacuation scenarios.  
 
 
Fig. 14. Passengers on the narrow walkway are delayed by passengers exiting the rail cars.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we compared the fire safety performance offered by conventional underground 
train configurations, in which cars are separated by internal doors (ID), and the new open 
wide gangway (OWG) configuration concept, in which the train interior is open from the rear 
car to the front one. Two underground train fire/evacuation situations were considered; one in 
which the car side doors are available for evacuation (the train in a wide tunnel) and the other 
in which only the end cab doors are available (the train in a narrow tunnel).  Two population 
configurations were also considered, fully loaded and half loaded. In addition, two ignition 
sources are applied, representing an accidental fire and an arson fire.  The analysis presented 
in this paper differs from previous published work on this topic as it includes both detailed 
fire and evacuation modelling and the fire modelling was coupled with the evacuation 
modelling.  This type of analysis is essential in order to fully investigate the complex 
coupling between the fire and evacuation dynamics. 
 
When considering the conclusions of this work it is important to keep in mind the nature of 
the assumptions required to simplify the analysis.  These included:    
 Only two fire sources were considered involving a medium sized luggage fire with 
and without an accelerant; 
 In the internal door configuration, the doors between cars are closed after the last 
surviving passenger has exited the car; 
 The analysis did not include the impact of enhanced ventilation resulting from 
breakage of windows or opening of car doors that cannot be used for evacuation. 
 
The main findings in this study are summarised as follows: 
 The OWG configuration may produce improved fire conditions in the car of fire 
origin compared to the conventional configuration  
o Flashover is unlikely to occur in all scenarios for trains with the OWG 
configuration with the use of flame retardant materials for interiors which are 
compliant with BS6853 Cat 1a; 
o Flashover is predicted to occur within the car of fire origin for trains with the 
conventional ID configuration in situations where the car side doors are not 
opened for evacuation and only the end car doors can be opened into the 
tunnel, and the internal doors between cars are shut after the last survivor 
passes through the doorway. 
 However, by taking into account the complex coupling between the fire and 
evacuation dynamics, for the scenarios examined, the OWG configuration is likely to 
result in significantly more casualties than the ID configuration. The difference in 
survivability is due primarily to the OWG train not being compartmented allowing 
fire effluent to rapidly spread from the car of fire origin throughout the entire train 
creating a hazardous environment for those still left on board during an evacuation. 
The impact of the spread of fire effluent throughout the train is accentuated in 
situations where the rapid evacuation of the passengers is delayed, such as when only 
the car end doors are available for evacuation (e.g. when the train is in a narrow 
tunnel) and when the train is fully loaded. 
 
The findings of this study are particularly relevant to underground train systems in cities such 
as London that have a number of narrow tunnels on their underground network and have 
trains that are almost always fully loaded during rush hours. The most challenging situations 
involve fully loaded OWG trains subjected to fire in narrow tunnels where evacuation is only 
possible through the car end doors.  While the differences in survivability between the OWG 
and ID train configurations is of concern for accidental fires, it is more significant in arson or 
terrorist inspired situations where the fire can be more severe.  
 
A possible structural mitigation which may improve the performance of OWG cars is the 
introduction of passenger operated fire curtains between cars.  However, this approach has 
the disadvantage of relying on the correct operation by passengers, as does the closing of the 
inter-car door in conventional rail cars.  Finally, the impact of improved ventilation within the 
trains on passenger survivability is currently being investigated by the authors and will be the 
subject of a later publication. 
 
Finally, an important general conclusion resulting from this work is that it is not appropriate 
to simply use the occurrence of flashover as the sole indicator for fire safety assessment in 
underground trains.  The determination of the ability of the passengers to safely evacuate to a 
place of relative safety before conditions within the evacuation route deteriorate is essential, 
and so it is important to consider coupled fire and evacuation analysis. This finding is also 
applicable to fire safety assessment for other enclosures such as buildings.   
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Table 1. Fire and evacuation scenarios.  
 
Fire 
Scenario 
Evacuation 
Scenario 
Car separation Opening exits for 
evacuation 
Population 
load 
Fire  
S1 S1a OWG Side passenger doors Full   
 
 
 
 
 
Accidental 
fire 
S1b OWG Side passenger doors Half  
S2 
 
S2a  ID Side passenger doors Full  
S2b  ID Side passenger doors Half  
S3 S3a OWG End Cab doors Full  
S3b OWG      End Cab doors Half  
S4a S4a  ID a End Cab doors Full  
S4b S4b ID a End Cab doors Half  
S5 
 
S5a OWG Side passenger doors Full   
 
 
 
 
 
Arson fire  
S5b OWG Side passenger doors Half  
S6 S6a  ID Side passenger doors Full  
S6b  ID Side passenger doors Half  
S7 S7a OWG End Cab doors Full  
S7b OWG     End Cab doors Half  
S8a S8a  ID a End Cab doors Full  
S8b S8b  ID a End Cab doors Half  
aThe internal doors between cars are shut after the last survivor passes through the doorway. 
Table 2. Material properties [3].  
 
 Density (kg/m3) Conductivity 
(W/mK) 
Specific Heat 
(J/kg) 
Ignition 
temperature (OC) 
FRP Polyester 1795 0.295 1673.5 448 
Styrene butadiene 1478 0.19 1987.5 419 
Wall panel 548a 0.11a 2500a 648 
Glass 1380 0.049 0.84 -- 
a Data from [23]. 
Table 3. Time to close the internal car doors in the ID configuration scenarios with the end 
cab door open.  
Scenario Between Cars 1-2 (s) Between Cars 2-3 (s) Between Cars 3-4 (s) 
S4a >1200 420 300 
S4b 720 110 20 
S8a 300 120 60 
S8b 300 110 20 
 
Table 4. Average evacuation statistics for all scenarios.  
 
 Scenario Population 
load 
Evacuation 
time (s) 
Severe injuries 
(survivors with 
 1>FED > 0.5) 
Total No. of 
incapacitations 
(FED=1)/ % 
No. of 
incapacitations 
within tunnel 
 Accidental Fire      
Side 
doors 
open 
S1a (OWG) 715 743 59.0 73.7 / 10.3% 3.6 
S2a (ID) 715 666 6.8 49.1 / 7% 1.6 
S1b (OWG) 360 285 0 0 0 
S2b (ID) 360 290 0 0 0 
Only 
end 
cab  
doors 
open 
S3a (OWG) 715 1448 77.9 419.7 / 59% 0.4 
S4a (ID) 715 2356 67.0 185.6 / 26% 0 
S3b (OWG) 360 1419 71.6 67.6 / 19% 0.4 
S4b (ID) 360 1624 0 0 0 
 Arson Fire      
Side 
doors 
open 
S5a (OWG) 715 666 27.5 254.7 / 36% 6.3 
S6a (ID) 715 530 9.2 136.5 / 19% 1.0 
S5b (OWG) 360 432 12.3 32.8 / 9% 3.8 
S6b (ID) 360 310 6.0 29.2 / 8% 1.3 
Only 
end 
cab 
doors 
open 
S7a (OWG) 715 917 70.5 549.9 / 77% 0.5 
S8a (ID) 715 2364 140.0 171.0 / 24% 0 
S7b (OWG) 360 910 70.0 194.3 / 54% 0.3 
S8b (ID) 360 1549 12.7 22.0 / 6% 0 
 
Table 5. Average evacuation statistics for agents moving between cars for scenarios with 
OWG configuration.  
 
Scenario From Car 2 to Car 1 From Car 3 to Car 2 From Car 3 to Car 4 
S1a 13.6 24.0 10.5 
S1b 4 11 5 
S5a 13.7 6.3 4.4 
S5b 4 11 5.7 
 
 
